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A wary embrace: What the China–Russia relationship means for the world is a useful and 
concise tool to understand the multifaceted relationship between Moscow and Bei-
jing. Drawing on what he previously labelled as a “Russian-Chinese axis of conven-
ience,” Bobo Lo elaborates on the trajectories undertaken by the two countries and 
disentangles a plurality of exogenous factors that pushed them towards a deeper in-
tegration.  
The book is divided in four chapters: in the first one Lo traces the relations 
between the two countries back to the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 and the “unbreakable friendship” between Mao and Stalin. In the second and 
third chapters, the core of his analysis, the author explores the bilateral economic, 
military and political ties and the different understandings that China and Russia 
have of the world order. Finally, he outlines multiple likely scenarios that could ma-
terialize as a consequence of Donald Trump’s election at the White House.  
From the historical overview it emerges that despite the ideological affinity, 
the diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing soon deteriorated. The nega-
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tive peak was reached with the border clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops 
along the Ussuri River in 1969 and the so-called Ping Pong diplomacy, with the alli-
ance between the US and China that definitely split the Communist bloc.  
Without being historically deterministic, Bobo Lo wants us to keep in mind 
that over the last fifty years the moments of divergence between Moscow and Bei-
jing clearly outnumbered those marked by common purpose. This aspect is key to 
put in perspective and relativize the strength and solidity of the current alliance. The 
dynamics positively changed in the 90’s when, in contrast to the scenario depicted 
by Fukuyama in The End of history (1992), Boris Yeltsin and Jang Zemin jointly in-
voked for a “Multipolar world. Later on, Russia and China – among others – estab-
lished the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, solved border disputes, and agreed 
on the “One China Policy”. Multiple exogenous factors more prominently pushed 
China and Russia towards a greater integration: first the NATO enlargement in 
Eastern Europe in the early 2000’s and the “Pivot to Asia” doctrine of Obama, 
both perceived as two forms of containment by the US against Russia and China 
respectively. Secondly, the 2008 economic crisis which reshuffled the hierarchies 
and economic flows in the international system. The (relative) fall of the European 
demand of energy, combined with the EU sanctions after the Crimean war, brought 
Russia to partly re-orient the pipeline networks towards China that also launched 
the well-known infrastructural project of the Belt and Road Initiative across Eura-
sia. Nevertheless, under the surface of an economic complementarity, with Russia 
providing energy and arms and China selling products and building infrastructures, 
there are latent contradictions. The Popular Republic of China is trying to diversify 
its energy suppliers, especially after the fall in Liquefied Natural Gas prices, by im-
porting gas from Middle East and Central Asia and reducing the importance of 
Russia for the Chinese economy. Furthermore, it reduced its foreign direct invest-
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ments to Russia in favor of other countries like Kazakhstan. For its part, Moscow is 
trying to contain China and opts for balance of power strategies by taking sides with 
China’s regional competitors within multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS or 
the SCO. In the Pacific, Russia also tries to cultivate ties with China’s rivals, India 
and Vietnam, and play a “swing power” role in the triangle China-Russia-Japan: on 
the one hand it often carries out joint military exercises with China; on the other “it 
played-off Beijing and Tokyo against each other in negotiations over the routing of 
the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline” (p. 100).  
Remarkably, China and Russia have different understandings of the future 
world order. Moscow strives for upgrading its “swing power” role also at the sys-
temic level by enacting a triple-pole system where Russia fluctuates between Wash-
ington and Beijing. Differently, Beijing looks for a “new bipolarism plus” with Chi-
na and the US as the two superpowers and other regional powers like Germany, 
Turkey or Russia. 
In depicting this ambivalent relationship between Russia and China, Bobo 
Lo can be placed in the middle of two opposite poles within a growing and open 
debate in International Relations. At the extremes, some scholars argue that the alli-
ance between Russia and China is a mere illusion (see, for instance, Friedman 2018); 
others maintain that these relations are increasingly consolidating (Maçães 2018, 
Trenin 2019). The oxymoron A wary embrace perfectly condenses Lo’s thought in be-
tween, though closer to a skeptical position. 
In cautiously foreseeing different future scenarios, Lo predicts how institu-
tional constraints, such as the Cold War interpretative schemes of the diplomatic 
corps and the idea of path-dependency would have hindered president Trump’s po-
tential positive attitude towards Putin. If we consider current dynamics, Putin seems 
to play exactly within the framework outlined in the book, trying to position Russia 
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as a swing power between the East and the West. On the one hand he searches for 
geopolitical and ideological contact points with European countries such as with 
president Macron’s France. On the other, Xi Jinping is the counterpart that Putin 
has met the most during his office. 
To conclude, this book is useful to understand the different layers and the 
complexity of the Russian-Chinese relationship. Nevertheless what could have been 
further elaborated is the interplay with regional dynamics, such as the coopera-
tion/competition in Central Asia and the Artic.  
Furthermore, probably influenced by his background as diplomat in the 
90’s, Bobo Lo implicitly sees the Russian-Chinese ties with typical Cold War lenses 
and compares them with strategic alliances such as the US-UK relations in that pe-
riod. In so doing, he pays less attention to the structural changes occurred in inter-
national system in transition towards a multipolar order where the interactions have 
more diversified and fluid. Against this backdrop, one could imagine that Russia 
and China will continue to pursue their own foreign policy independently, without 
binding themselves in a traditional Cold-War-like strategic alliance, thus staying 
firmly connected in their “wary embrace”. The changing nature of alliances has to 
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